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ABSTRACT
HOW SMART IS YOUR ANDROID SMARTPHONE?
by Deepika Mulani
Smart phones are ubiquitous today. These phones generally have access to
sensitive personal information and, consequently, they are a prime target for attackers. A
virus or worm that spreads over the network to cell phone users could be particularly
damaging.
Due to a rising demand for secure mobile phones, manufacturers have increased
their emphasis on mobile security. In this project, we address some security issues
relevant to the current Android smartphone framework. Specifically, we demonstrate an
exploit that targets the Android telephony service. In addition, as a defense against the
loss of personal information, we provide a means to encrypt data stored on the external
media card. While smartphones remain vulnerable to a variety of security threats, this
encryption provides an additional level of security.
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1.0

Introduction
Mobile phones are no longer devices restricted to making voice callsthey can run most

of the processes that one expects from a desktop computer. Mobile phones are equipped with
applications such as e-mail clients, chat clients, short messaging service (SMS), and multimedia
messaging service (MMS). Most smartphones are equipped with cameras so that one can have
personal pictures and videos on the phone. Communication between two mobile devices is no
longer limited to the services of a GSM provider. One can have two mobile phones communicate
with the help of Bluetooth, external media cards, or the Internet. Thanks to the efforts of the
World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) and Open Mobile Alliance (OMA), being away from one’s
laptop does not mean being disconnected from the rest of the Internet world.
The first mobile phone virus, Cabir, was created in 2004 and targeted for Symbian OSbased phones. This virus replicated itself on Bluetooth wireless networks [1]. Since then, there
have been many similar versions of the virus and a few new ones. However, the number of
mobile phone viruses is significantly fewer than computer viruses.
One major difference between PC and mobile phone viruses has been that it is more
difficult for mobile virus infections to spread as fast as computer viruses can. This is due to the
variety of mobile platforms; lack of documentation and lack of support tools has led to less
exploitation of vulnerabilities [1].
However, the trend has been to synchronize computers with smartphones. Hence, the
threat to all critical and private data has become twofold. Even worse is that smartphones come
with a built-in billing system; a virus can cause immediate financial loss. Most of the threats
interrupt user productivity, drain the battery, increase messaging charges, and have the potential
to damage users’ reputations.
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With the rich variety of data centric applications available, it is important that the
smartphone be made smart to preserve user privacy. Various platforms have evolved in the
process to achieve this goal. Some of the current mobile platforms such as Symbian, Android,
and so on, have taken steps to ensure that their architecture is build around security.

1.1

Objective of the Project
The objective of this project is to identify security holes and any missing security features

in Android’s architecture. Using this as a starting point, the goal is to develop a prototype
application that serves as a justification for our findings.

1.2

Order of the Project
Section 2 begins with a discussion of the Android security architecture and some of its

limitations. Section 3 briefly covers the security architecture of iPhone and Symbian, comparing
them with Android’s architecture. Section 4 lists some mobile phone risks, and Section 5 briefly
covers some of the best practices that users of smartphones should follow for their personal
security.
Section 6 discusses in detail the telephony exploitation that we have successfully
deployed on Android phones. This malicious behavior tries to breach the user’s privacy by
retrieving all his or her contacts and sending an SMS message on each incoming voice call. It
also prevents the user from dialing any numbers, hence exploiting the most basic feature of a
phone.
Section 7 covers the implementation details and limitations of the security enhancement
we have developed for dealing with external data. In the current Android framework, each
application has private access of the data stored on the internal phone memory. However, this is
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not applicable to data stored on an external media card. In our solution, we encrypt the data
being written to external media and store the encryption key on the phone memory, which is
private to the application that uses this solution.
Section 8 concludes our work and reiterates our goals and achievements while studying
the security architecture of smartphone operating systems, and provides the scope for further
study.

2.0

Android Framework

2.1

Introduction
Android is the mobile phone platform led by Google’s Open Handset Allowance (OHA).

Android has a unique security model in which the user is in complete control of the device. It is
an open source platform based on Linux. All applications are written in Java and compiled into a
custom byte-code (DEX) [6]. Each application executes in its own process with its own instance
of the Dalvik virtual machine interpreter [2].
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Figure 1. Android architecture [6]

2.2

Application behavior
Every application in Android runs as a separate process with a unique UID, unlike a

desktop computer where all the applications run with the same UID. The UID of an application
in Android protects its data. Programs cannot typically read or write each other’s data, and
sharing between applications must be done explicitly [3]. Due to this feature, a compromise such
as a buffer overflow attack [3,17] is restricted to the application and its data. However, it is
important to note that an application can launch another program that will run with the launching
application’s UID.
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For a developer to run an application on the Android phone, his or her application needs
to be signed. Developers can generate self-signed certificates and use this for code signing. Code
signing is done to enable developers to update their own applications without creating
complicated interfaces and permissions.

2.3

Application components
Applications are comprised of components. Components interact using Intent messages

[6]. Recipient components assert their desire to receive Intent messages by defining Intent filters
[6]. There are four types of components used to construct applications:
1. Activity components interact with the user via the touchscreen and keypad. Only one
activity is active at a time, and processing is suspended for all other activities [5].
2. Service components provide for background processing when an application’s
activity leaves focus and another GUI application comes in the foreground [6].
3. Broadcast receiver components provide a general mechanism for asynchronous event
notifications [6]. The receivers receive Intent messages that are implicitly addressed
with action strings; for instance, dialing a number is associated with the action
OUTGOING_CALL_ACTION.
4. Content provider components are the preferred method for sharing data between
applications [5]. These APIs implement an SQL-like interface; however, the backend
implementation is up to the application developer.
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Figure 2. Android applications component IPC [3]

2.4

Application level security framework
Applications need approval to do things their user might object to, such as sending SMS

messages, using the contacts database, or using the camera. To keep track of what the application
is permitted to do, Android maintains manifest permissions that are enforced by the middleware
reference monitor. The permission label is a unique text string that can be defined by the OS as
well as by a third-party developer. These permissions indicate what resources and interfaces are
available to the application at run-time. An example of a permission is READ_CONTACTS,
which permits the application to read the user’s address book. In addition to reading and writing
data, permissions allow applications to access system services such as dialing a number without
prompting the user or taking complete control of the screen and obscuring the status bar.
A developer should specify all permissions that his or her application requires in the
AndroidManifest.xml file; however, it is not necessary that all permissions be granted. When the
application is getting installed, the user has the choice to decide whether or not to trust the
software based on the application’s promised features. and the permissions required. These
permissions are different from file permissions. Once an application is installed, its permissions
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cannot be changed. The fewer permissions an application needs, the more comfortable the user
should feel installing the application.
Permissions have a protection level. The four protection levels are outlined in Table 1.
Table 1. Android manifest permission protection levels [2]

Permissions for application features with minor consequences such
as VIBRATE, which lets applications vibrate the device. Suitable for

Normal

granting rights not generally of keen interest to users; users can
review but may not be explicitly warned.
Permissions such as WRITE_SETTINGS or SEND_SMS are
dangerous as they could be used to reconfigure the device or incur

Dangerous

tolls. This level marks permissions in which the users will be
interested or be potentially surprised. Android will warn users about
the need for these permissions on install.
These permissions can be granted only to other applications signed

Signature

with the same key as this program. This allows secure coordination
without publishing a public interface.
Same as Signature except that programs on the system image also
qualify for access. This allows programs on custom Android systems

SignatureOrSystem

to also get the permission. This protection is to help integrate system
builds and won’t be typically used by developers.

The permission label policy is used to protect applications from each other and also
various components within an application. In the mobile phone environment, it is difficult for the
operating system to manage access control policies of hundreds of unknown applications.
Therefore, Android simplifies this by having the developers define their permission labels to
access their interfaces. By doing so, the developer does not need to know about existing and
future applications; permission labels allow the developer to indirectly influence security
decisions.
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2.5

Files and preferences
Android uses UNIX-style file permissions [2]. Each application has its own area on the

file system that it owns [2,16]. This is similar to programs having a home directory to go along
with their User IDs. This feature is limited only to the internal phone memory and not the
external memory. The standard way for applications to expose their private data to other
applications is through content providers [16].

2.6

Android limitation
The current security policy of Android works on a static level only during installation to

identify whether the application is permitted all the requested permissions from the user. Once
the permission is granted, there is no way to govern to whom these rights are given or how they
are later exercised [3]. Permissions are asserted as vague suggestions as to what kinds of
protections the application desires. One must place good faith in the user and the OS to make
good choices about permissions granted to the application which, in many cases, may not be the
absolute best choice.
Due to the above architecture, Android system libraries have limited ability to control
installed third-party applications that can be granted permissions to use their interfaces. This
implies that there is no control to restrict an installed application based on its signatures. Further,
it is not possible to define the desirable configurations of an installed third-party application such
as the minimum version and the set of permissions it is allowed or disallowed.
This implies that Android applications built with the right set of permissions protect the
system from malicious applications but provides severely limited infrastructure for applications
to protect themselves.
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3.0

iPhone and Symbian Mobile Frameworks
iPhone and Symbian are the two popular competitors of Android smartphones. Each of

these platforms has its own security model. A comparison of these architectures is essential to
understanding the current trends in mobile security.

3.1

iPhone security architecture
iPhone’s security features include encryption of data in transit and authorization by

strong passwords to corporate services. On iPhone 3GS, there is a new enhancement of hardware
encryption of data stored on the device [12]. Users of the device can be restricted from accessing
certain features by setting up device restrictions through configuration policies.
iPhone also comes with the feature of remote wipe, which is helpful in case of the device
being lost or stolen. The user of iPhone can login to his or her web account and issue the remote
command to securely wipe the the phone’s data, making it unrecoverable. It also supports
erasing of data from the device after a certain number of failed authorization attempts. To
provide secure access to corporate data, iPhone also integrates with VPN technologies [12].
It is mandatory that all iPhone applications be signed. Third party applications are
required to be signed by developers with an Apple-provided certificate. Runtime protection is
also available, which ensures that an application has not become untrusted since the last time it
was used. This is an important security feature that the Android platform lacks.
Apple’s app store is a guarded community. The apps that get listed have been certified by
Apple. The developers of the apps are required to be registered and pay annual subscription fees.
The app and each of its versions is evaluated by the Apple team, and any app that can potentially
pose a threat to personal data, contains inappropriate content, or breaks the law is rejected by
Apple.
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At Google’s Android marketplace, the approach is fundamentally different: Any
application can be uploaded to the marketplace, and Google does not evaluate these apps. What
protects Android users from these apps is the concept of “capabilities” or “permissions” [8].
At installation, each app tells the Android OS what capabilities it requires. Based on the
usage and claim of the applications, it is up to the user to decide if the capabilities are
reasonable [8].
This system has the advantage of being enforced by a true platform. An application
cannot exploit any other resources to which it is not entitled. However, the disadvantage of this
trust system is that there is no way to be sure that an application will limit itself within the
defined boundary once it is installed. Any application can request capabilities and appear
legitimate on the surface, while in the background, it may be doing something malicious.
The bigger problem is that the marketplace relies on the user’s ability to evaluate the
risks of the application they want to download and run. Not all users are aware of security threats
and ways that their information can be compromised.

3.2

Symbian’s security framework
Symbian was one of the first smartphone operating systems, with its first phone based on

Symbian v6.0, released in 2001. Nokia acquired Symbian Software Limited in 2008 and, in
February 2010, Symbian source code became available as open source [14].
To free the users from the task of deciding about security of an application, Symbian OS
released Symbian v9.x, which introduced the concept of platform security. This includes
capabilities and Symbian signing. In early 2005, Symbian 9.1 was released and can run
applications that pass the constraints set by both the Android and iPhone platforms. This means
that, just as in Android, an application needs to enlist permissions or capabilities that its APIs
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will use. This is exactly the UNIX-style permissions per process-based model; however, unlike
Android, this application is not available for market use without the signing process.
There are two types of certificates used by the Symbian community: A developer
certificate is used by the developer to sign his or her application and run on a specific phone.
This developer certificate contains the requested capabilities of the application but is confined to
run only on certain phones as specified by the International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI)
which are mentioned in the certificate request process. It is not possible to request more than 20
IMEI numbers in a developer certificate. This means that a malicious application does not spread
extensively as soon as it is developed.
The second certificate is the Symbian Signed Certificate, obtained through the Symbian
signing process. Just like iPhone, a Symbian application needs to be signed by a certifying
authority before deploying the application in the market. There is a cost associated with each
signing. One needs a publisher ID from Verisign, which costs $200 per year, and the Symbian
signing process has an additional cost of around $300 [9] per signature.
Once the application is ready to be deployed, it needs to be submitted to the Symbian
signed site [15]. There, the application is tested against criteria specified by Symbian. After the
testing is successfully completed, the application is certified and returned to the developer, who
can then distribute the application. This process is shown in Figure 3.
Since signing has a cost associated with it, it is unlikely that virus writers will be
submitting their apps for Symbian signing, in which case it is not possible to distribute malicious
applications.
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Figure 3. Symbian certification and signing process [10]

The Symbian signing process implies that the only likely way to hack a Symbian phone is
by disabling its platform security feature. Once this is done, an unsigned application can be
installed. Once platform security is disabled, the phone is at risk, allowing access to system files,
changing how the operating system works, and access to a wide variety of viruses, malware, and
so on.
Therefore, the best a user of a Symbian smartphone can do is never to disable platform
security. Developers must not install applications signed with a developer certificate that can
internally disable platform security. It is not possible for attackers to do so as a developer
certificate can be obtained for a maximum 20 IMEI numbers and it is not possible to guess IMEI
number of any phone.
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Theoretically, Symbian’s platform security concept is more powerful than the security
model employed by current Android and iPhone smartphones because it is a fusion of the best
features of these two platforms’ security architecture.
With the advent of smartphones and the variety of information these can hold, it is
necessary that the users of such phone become educated about the various intricacies and
security risks involved in their use.

4.0

Mobile Phone Risks
The more popular an operating system, the more likely it is to be infected by a virus—

just as in the PC world. Microsoft Windows is more often subject to malicious attacks than is
Apple Macintosh. Similarly, in the mobile world, Android, iPhone, and Symbian-based phones
are the most popular targets for attack. Several risks factors indicate that most of the mobile
market is ripe for powerful new attacks. Some of these are:
1. Proof of concept viruses and variations of these have been published on the Internet
(e.g., Cabir virus provided a code base for VLASCO.A and DAMPIG.A) [7].
2. Most phones do not have security software or security policies [7].
3. Smartphones are capable of high-speed data transmission [7].
Closed devices are less likely to be infected [7]. “Closed” means that the devices just
make calls and have a simple address book but do not have the ability to install third-party
applications.
Web browsing increases the possibility of infection. Devices that enable third-party
application installation without OS restriction are at high risk for infection. The cost of a lost
device is small in comparison to the loss caused by compromised sensitive data. Such loss can
cause diminished customer confidence, financial loss, and brand damage.
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Infection can occur or spread through any of the following:
1. Inserting infected external media card.
2. Synchronizing with a PC that installs an infected file [7].
3. Web downloads [7].
4. Bluetooth communication etc.

5.0

Best Practices
Most mobile phones operate on a corporate network but are disconnected for a long

period of time and often change locations. Therefore, it is essential that corporate companies take
care to prevent loss of personal sensitive information while reaping the benefits of increased
productivity.
The following practices will help users take advantage of available smartphones while
minimizing the security risks [7].
1. If a mobile phone is lost or stolen, the service provider or phone manufacturer should
provide a device management feature to “wipe” all data.
2. Devices accessing corporate IT resources should access remote information over
VPNs for secure access.
3. Only authorized applications should be provided access to the network. Authorization
may be based on a user-prompted password before access begins. Authorization
should not be limited to the user’s acceptance at installation time.
4. Sensitive data in transit should always be encrypted. In addition, sensitive data on the
phone—such as calendar entries, phonebook contacts, product prices, customer
orders, and so on—should be encrypteds.
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5. Smartphones should be shipped with antivirus software installed. This software
should have a feature that scans for third-party downloaded apps that keep running
for a long time and consistently access sensitive and private information. The virus
scan software should stop such applications and inform the user of such activity,
giving him or her the option of uninstalling it. Notable smartphone antivirus software
includes McAfee for Microsoft Windows Mobile devices, and Symantec Mobile
security for Symbian.
6. Risk assessment should be done before a business adopts the latest trend of mobility
through smartphones.
7. User education and training is essential to make users aware of the risks and liabilities
involved when using smartphone applications.

6.0

Experiment Details and Results
We have been successful in demonstrating Android’s security limitations by exploiting

Android’s telephony security. In addition, as mentioned in Section 2.5, the lack of security when
dealing with data stored externally has been considered, and a defense has been developed to
provide privacy to applications when handling external storage media.

6.1

Exploiting telephony security
We have implemented an Android activity and a receiver application which exploits the

current telephony security of the Android phone. This application intercepts any incoming call
and sends SMS to all the phonebook contacts with details of the call. Further, the application
receives a broadcast of an outgoing call and aborts this call.
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The permissions required by our application are mentioned in the Androidmanifest.xml,
as shown in Figure 4.
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.CALL_PHONE" />
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.MODIFY_PHONE_STATE"
/>
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE"
/>
<uses-permission
android:name="android.permission.PROCESS_OUTGOING_CALLS" />
<uses-permission
android:name="android.permission.ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION" />
<uses-permission
android:name="android.permission.READ_CONTACTS"></uses-permission>
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.SEND_SMS"></usespermission>
<uses-permission
android:name="android.permission.WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE"></usespermission>

Figure 4. XML Permissions for telephony exploitation

When the application is installed on the phone, the user is notified of these permissions,
as shown in Figure 5. It is up to the user whether he or she wants to install the application or not.
It is very easy to deceive a novice user by promising a false set of features. This will often cause
the user accept all the enlisted permissions that the malicious application uses.
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Figure 5. Install time notification of permissions

6.2

Tapping incoming call
The first malicious attack of the application is that it intercepts any incoming call (the call

might be accepted or it might be a missed call). On intercepting the call, the application obtains
the details of the incoming call’s number. To make this a breach of privacy, upon getting this
notification, the application fetches all phonebook contacts and sends SMS to all these contacts.
This message is sent silently in the background without the knowledge of the mobile phone user.
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To send SMS on an incoming voice call notification, we need to override the method
“onCallStateChanged” of Android’s “PhoneListener” class. Figure 6 depicts our implementation
for this, along with the registering for notifications of change in call state.

// TelephonyManager
final TelephonyManager telMgr = (TelephonyManager)
getSystemService(Context.TELEPHONY_SERVICE);
this.telMgrOutput.setText(telMgr.toString());
previousState = telMgr.getCallState();
// PhoneStateListener
PhoneStateListener phoneStateListener = new PhoneStateListener() {
@Override
public void onCallStateChanged(final int state, final String
incomingNumber)
{
telMgrOutput.setText(getTelephonyOverview(telMgr,incoming
Number));
if(state == TelephonyManager.CALL_STATE_IDLE &&
(previousState == TelephonyManager.CALL_STATE_RINGING ||
previousState == TelephonyManager.CALL_STATE_OFFHOOK))
{
sendSMS(incomingNumber);
}
previousState = state;
}
};
// Registering to receive incoming call notifications
telMgr.listen(phoneStateListener,
PhoneStateListener.LISTEN_CALL_STATE);

Figure 6. Code for receiving incoming voice call number and registering for notification

This is followed by fetching the phonebook contacts. There is a CONTACTS content
provider in the framework that contains the table People. From this table, we fetch the phone
numbers of all the contacts.
Whenever we receive an incoming voice call notification, we send SMS to all the
contacts. Our SMS message includes the phone number of the calling party. Figure 7 indicates
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the form of the SMS message being sent by our application. To send the SMS, one needs to use
the “SMSManager” class of Android. This class provides a method “sendTextMessage” in which
we specify the text message and the receiver’s phone number. A code sample is shown in Figure
8. In our demo application, we have a GUI display the current call state and any incoming call
number. This is shown in Figure 9.

Figure 7. Message sent on new incoming call
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PendingIntent sentPI = PendingIntent.getBroadcast(this, 0, new
Intent("SMS_SENT"), 0);
SmsManager sms = SmsManager.getDefault();
//sending message to all phone contacts
for(int i = 0; i < phoneNo.size(); i++) {
sms.sendTextMessage(phoneNo.get(i), null, "You don't have to
ever spy on me. I'll let you know who am I talking to. I received
call from "+ number, sentPI, null);
}

Figure 8. Code for SMS sending

Figure 9. Incoming voice call notification
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6.3

Aborting outgoing voice call
A second malicious attack involves aborting any outgoing call. To get notification of

outgoing calls, we registered a class in the application as a broadcast receiver in
AndroidManifest.xml. This is depicted in Figure 10. This class is derived from the class
“BroadcastReceiver” and overrides the method “onReceive”.
<receiver android:name=".OutgoingCallReceiver">
<intent-filter>
<action android:name="android.intent.action.NEW_OUTGOING_CALL" />
</intent-filter>
</receiver>

Figure 10. XML registering for outgoing call notification

Now when the user tries to dial, our overridden method receives the notification, and it
aborts the call. This is done by calling the method “abortBroadcast”. This method will prevent
any other broadcast receivers from receiving the broadcast. As a result, the basic telephony
application is not receiving the event of an outgoing call and, therefore, the user cannot dial a
number. Figure 11 shows the notification that is displayed by our application when intercepting
and aborting an outgoing call.

6.4

Validation
The above telephony exploitation application could have been installed under a false

claim of beneficial features. However, the above two malicious attacks indicate that once an
application is installed, it can have unpredictable behavior making this a Trojan horse attack. The
operating system has no control over preventing such attacks.
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Figure 11. Outgoing voice call aborted

7.0

Security Feature for Android
As mentioned in Section 2.5, every Android application owns a private area of memory

on the internal file system. As a result, every owner application has permission only to read and
write files that it creates. This is because the files are created in the default private mode; that is,
MODE_PRIVATE. No other application can access this file unless the owner application
explicitly grants a global read-write access using the modes MODE_WORLD_READABLE and
MODE_WORLD_WRITEABLE.
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However, this feature is not applicable to files stored on external media such as a Secure
Digital (SD) Card. This means that if a private file needs to be stored on the SD card by an
application, then such a file is accessible to any other application. It is common for applications
on an Android phone to use external media for storing data since the internal phone memory is
small—no more than 512MB on Nexus One [18]. Therefore, we have developed a solution to
provide privacy access to files stored on the external media just as the framework provides for
phone memory files.

7.1

Encryption of files stored on SD card
To overcome this limitation of storing easily unprotected files on the external memory,

we have introduced an API that can be extended as a library and used by other Android
applications looking for such a feature.
To use this feature, the application needs to call the library interface with the name of the
file to be encrypted and a password. Every file stored on the media card is encrypted the first
time by a randomly generated key. To enable decryption, the key needs to be persistent. Since
we are trying to emulate the private access feature of the internal file system, we have stored the
key in the application’s private file space. The password provided to the interface is used to
protect the encryption key.
The encryption algorithm works as follows:
1. The encryption algorithm selected is DES.
2.

A symmetric key is generated for the purpose of encryption. This is done by using
the KeyGenerator class of Java. We assume this provides enough randomness and
generates a hard-to-guess key. Using this as the encryption key, the data to be stored
on the external media card is encrypted and stored on the card.
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3.

From the password entered by the user, a hash is computed. The hashing algorithm
used is MD5. This generates a 128-bit hash value.

4.

The computed hash value serves as the key for encrypting the symmetric key. The
encrypted symmetric key is stored on the internal phone memory within the
application’s privately accessible file space.

We define E(data,key) to mean that the algorithm encrypts “data” with the “key” and
h(password) denotes a cryptographic hashing function. Then the above algorithm is as follows:
KeyGenerator(“DES”)



SymmetricKey

E(Data to store on SD Card, SymmetricKey)



Encrypted Data on SD Card

E(SymmetricKey, h(Password entered by the user)) 

Encrypted Key stored on phone

memory in the application’s private file
space.
Figure 12 is the code sample for encryption of file data and storing of the key in the
private file space.
To demonstrate encryption, we have created our own user interface, as seen in Figure 13.
The user needs to specify the name of the file that he or she wants to encrypt along with the
password. The password is hashed and serves as a key for encrypting the symmetric key.
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For the purpose of this example, since we do not have access to the private files of the
phone, the files to be encrypted are on the SD Card. The file selected in Figure 13 is stored after
encryption as “AalIzzWell_encrypted.mp3,” and its corresponding encrypted symmetric key is
stored in the application’s private directory as “AalIzzWell_key.txt.”

String algorithm = "DES";
Cipher c1 = Cipher.getInstance(algorithm);
SecretKey myKey = KeyGenerator.getInstance(algorithm).generateKey();
c1.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE, myKey);
encrypted = c1.doFinal(fileText);
//encrypt the key and store that on the local storage
String name =
fileName.substring(0,fileName.lastIndexOf('.'))+"_key.txt";
FileOutputStream outStream = openFileOutput(name, MODE_PRIVATE);
byte[] raw = myKey.getEncoded();
//store the raw bytes of the encrypted key
SecretKeySpec keySpec = new
SecretKeySpec(hashPassword(passCode),0,8,algorithm);
SecretKeyFactory keyFactory =
SecretKeyFactory.getInstance(keySpec.getAlgorithm());
Key key = keyFactory.generateSecret(keySpec);
c1.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE, key);
byte[] encryptedKey = c1.doFinal(raw);
outStream.write(encryptedKey);
outStream.close();

Figure 12. Code for encryption
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Figure 13. Encryption of file on external media

7.2

Encryption limitations
Some limitations of this encryption process are:
1. Encryption will work only if the SD Card is not being used as a USB storage medium
by the computer to which the phone is connected. In this event, the user is notified, as
in Figure 14, that no SD Card is available on the phone. The reason for this limitation
is that the Android framework does not want to get into the situation of handling
synchronization issues; to avoid this, the external card is locked for the device to
which it is available. To continue, one can just scroll down the notification panel and
switch off the USB storage, as seen in Figure 15.
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2. For file sizes greater than 2MB, the current encryption APIs are slow and can fail. We
are using the Cipher class in Java Development environment for the purpose of
encryption. It appears that this is due to the limited memory available on the phone,
most of which the encryption process consumes.

Figure 14. External media unavailable on encryption
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Figure 15. Switching off USB storage

7.3

Decryption algorithm
The decryption process works in the complete reverse order of encryption. The algorithm

can be broadly outlined as:
D(Encrypted symmetric key file stored on application’s private file space, h(Password entered
by the user))



SymmerticKey

D(Encrypted file, SymmetricKey)



Original File

Figure 16 shows an encrypted file selected from the SD card after the user has entered the
password. In case the password entered is incorrect, the user is notified that the SecretKey used
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for encryption is unobtainable. This happens due to “BadPaddingException” thrown when trying
to obtain the SecretKey. Figure 17 is an example of this scenario. The decrypted file of Figure 16
is Diya_decrypted.jpg.

Figure 16. Decryption successful
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Figure 17. Decryption failure

7.4

Validation
To validate our encryption feature, we have checked the encrypted and the decrypted

versions of various files. We have also tried the above process in different file formats such as
mp3, jpg, and txt.
The encrypted versions of mp3 and jpg are not in the corresponding file format as these
do not open with their respective file viewers. These files were rejected as being non-supported
formats. In addition, the encrypted txt file includes non-readable characters.
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On decrypting any of these encrypted versions, we found that we obtained our original
data. Thus, this validates our technique of making external data securely available to an
application.

8.0

Conclusion
With the current security architecture, most smartphones are vulnerable to attacks

because the user of the phone is instrumental in deciding on applications to be installed on the
phone. It is not easy for a user to judge applications by their description. The Android framework
is one platform that expects the user to be security conscious and implicitly assumes application
developers are not sinister. Because of this, a user may unknowingly install software that poses a
security threat. Our telephony application provides such an example.
To free the user from making decisions as to which applications to install, the security
framework could introduce the concept of a runtime check for each application. Any application
not behaving in the expected manner would then raise an alarm.
We also observed that the Android security framework is confined to the storage media
available on the phone. We extended this security to the external media.
We conclude that the Android security framework is susceptible to vulnerabilities and has
scope for improvement. We believe that the Android security framework needs to extend its
static install time “Permission”-based security model to a more dynamic runtime security
provider and also incorporate security for external storage mediums.
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